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Is sociology a science? On scientism and the sociology of knowledge
Philosophers since Aristotle and Plato have been concerned with the nature of human behaviour and social organisation. While they often postulated on the conditions for ‘the good life’ and the ideal society, they did not engage in a systematic study of people and societies. The development of sociology, arising primarily from the work of philosophers and economists, explicitly sought to study contemporary society and human behaviour in a scientific way. Some of the earliest sociologists, such as Auguste Comte (1798–1857), were exponents of the view that the research methods used in the natural sciences (for example, physics, chemistry, and biology) could be used to study society. Comte called this scientific method ‘positivism’, which was based on the following features:
As many sociologists have pointed out since Comte, human behaviour is a much more complex and variable subject of study than that of the natural world. Humans are conscious beings who have motivations, intentions, and feelings, and have the ability to choose various courses of action. As a consequence, the notion of ‘social laws’, akin to the laws of physics, is nonsensical.
Many researchers in the natural sciences remain committed to positivism and continue to view the study of anything that cannot be objectively quantified, such as human beliefs and intentions, as unscientific. Sociologists often characterise this as ‘scientism’ (a dogmatic belief in the superiority of the methods of the natural sciences to discover ‘the truth’). At its extreme, scientism represents a reverence for (natural) science and ‘scientific progress’ and dismisses the social sciences as unscientific. A sociology of knowledge, particularly that advocated by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) in The Social Construction of Reality, suggests that all knowledge is socially influenced by the cultural, political, moral, and historical context in which it is produced.
The sheer cultural diversity that exists among societies (such as the differences between Chinese, French, and Argentinean societies, for example) provides empirical evidence that refutes the assumptions of positivism. Nonetheless, as sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) extolled, this does not mean sociologists should not attempt to conduct ‘value-free’ and systematic research by being detached and open-minded about what they study.
Sociology is a social science: it uses systematic research methods and attempts to interpret data in an objective way that is open to public scrutiny. Still, the subjective nature of human existence means it is unlikely that there can ever be a universal theory of human behaviour or the identification of social laws that specify the causes of societal development and change. This is not to say that sociology cannot identify social patterns and common influences that affect individuals and societies, but this is far from the universal laws of the natural sciences. It should also be noted that theories and ‘facts’ have changed over time in the natural sciences as well, as new methods and knowledge come to light. As Thomas Kuhn (1922–96) argued in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962, 1970, 1996), there have been many ‘paradigm shifts’ and scientific revolutions of thought in the natural sciences (see also Hacking 1981, 1999).
While few sociologists subscribe to positivism today, there are disagreements over the most appropriate ways to study society, with some researchers preferring quantitative approaches (such as surveys) over qualitative approaches (such as interviews) because they believe that quantitative research is more objective (see Chapter 4 in Public Sociology for further discussion of this issue). Such a stance is often taken by ‘post-positivists’, who acknowledge the limits of a scientific model of research, but nonetheless persevere with such study due to a belief in its superiority over other forms of knowledge. In general, though, there has been an acceptance in sociology, and in the social sciences more broadly, that all research methods potentially have something to offer.
References
Berger, P. L. & Luckmann, T. 1966, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in
the Sociology of Knowledge, Penguin, London.
Hacking, I. 1981, Scientific Revolutions, Oxford University Press, New York.
Hacking, I. 1999, The Social Construction of What?, Harvard University Press, New
York.
Kuhn, T. 1996, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edn, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, IL.
Discussion questions
Source: Adapted from Germov, J. & McGee, T. (2005) ‘Australian Sociology: Recent Trends and Prospects’, in J. Germov & T. McGee (eds) Histories of Australian Sociology, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 355–85.